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Abstract
During Lord Gordon Slynn’s period in office as the Advocate General at the European Court
of Justice (”ECJ” or “Court”) in Luxembourg, Lord Slynn delivered opinions in many significant
cases covering the whole range of European Communities (”EC”) competences, from cases con-
cerning common agricultural policy and civil services to those concerned with the development
of the common market and the interpretation of the substantive law of the European Community.
Comments on Lord Slynn’s opinions in cases concerning the substantive law of the internal market
and on state aid cases have been published in other works. In this short Essay, the focus will be on
five selected opinions delivered by Lord Slynn in the field of competition and antitrust law, namely
the IBM, Pioneer, Hasselblad, Ford, and BAT cases.
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SELECTED OPINIONS OF LORD SLYNN AS 
ADVOCATE GENERAL 
Rosa Greaves 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1981, Lord Gordon Slynn,1 then known as Sir Gordon 
Slynn, became Advocate General2 at the European Court of 
Justice (“ECJ” or “Court”) in Luxembourg. Lord Slynn 
succeeded Jean Pierre Warner, the first Advocate General 
nominated by the United Kingdom upon its accession to the 
European Communities (“EC” or “Community”).3 During his 
period in office, Lord Slynn delivered opinions in many 
significant cases covering the whole range of EC competences, 
from cases concerning common agricultural policy and civil 
service to those concerned with the development of the common 
 
*  Professor of Law, School of Law at Glasgow University and University of Oslo. 
The author would like to thank Jujhar Dhanda for assistance with research undertaken 
for this Essay. 
1. Sir Gordon Slynn was Advocate General from 1981 to 1988 and then became the 
U.K. judge at the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or “Court”). In 1992, he returned to 
the United Kingdom and was appointed to the Judicial Committee of the House of 
Lords, the highest court in the United Kingdom. Francis G. Jacobs, Justice: Some Personal 
Reflections, in 1 LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY: JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW 17 (David O’Keeffe ed., 2000). From then on he was 
known as Lord Slynn of Hadley. 
2. The Advocate General is a unique feature of the ECJ. The Advocate General is of 
equal status to an ECJ judge but does not participate in the deliberation of the 
judgment. The Advocate General delivers an opinion to assist the judges in their 
deliberations. The opinion officially closes the oral procedure of the hearing in a case 
before the ECJ. Id. at 17–18. 
3. The United Kingdom acceded to the then-three “European Communities” 
(European Atomic Community, European Economic Community, and European Coal 
and Steel Community) on January 1, 1973. Council Decision Adjusting the Instruments 
Concerning the Accession of the New Member States of the European Communities, 
O.J. L 2/1 (1973). There are currently eight advocates general, five of whom are 
appointed by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The other 
advocates general rotate among the remaining Member States. Jo Hunt, The European 
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, in UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION 
INSTITUTIONS 105 (Alex Warleigh ed., 2002). 
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market4 and the interpretation of the substantive law of the 
European Community.5 Comments on Lord Slynn’s opinions in 
cases concerning the substantive law of the internal market and 
on state aid cases have been published in other works.6 In this 
short Essay, the focus will be on five selected opinions delivered 
by Lord Slynn in the field of competition and antitrust law, 
namely the IBM,7 Pioneer,8 Hasselblad,9 Ford,10 and BAT11 cases. 
I. THE IBM CASE 
IBM v. Commission was important in establishing what actions 
of the European Commission (“Commission”), when acting as a 
competition enforcement agency, were subject to judicial review. 
IBM lawyers challenged a statement of objections12 issued by the 
European Commission at the end of its investigation as to 
whether IBM had violated article 86 of the Treaty Establishing 
the European Economic Community (“EEC Treaty”) (now 
article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (“TFEU”))13 through conduct considered to be an abuse 
 
4. The term “common market” was replaced in common usage in 1987 by the term 
“internal market.” 
5. Since December 1, 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the terms 
“EC” and “European Community” have been replaced by the “EU” and “European 
Union.” However, this Essay uses “EC” and the “European Community.” 
6. See, e.g., Rosa Greaves, Judicial Review of Commission Decisions on State Aid to 
Airlines, in 1 LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY, supra note 1, at 
625; Pieter Verloren van Themaat, Some Opinions of Sir Gordon Slynn as Advocate General, 
in 1 LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY, supra note 1, at 3 
(Professor Verloren van Themaat was a colleague of Sir Gordon Slynn as Advocate 
General from 1981 to 1986). 
7. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Commission (IBM), Case 60/81, [1981] E.C.R. 2639. 
8. SA Musique Diffusion Française v. Commission (Pioneer), Joined Cases 100–
03/80, [1983] E.C.R. 1825. 
9. Hasselblad (GB) Ltd. v. Commission, Case 86/82, [1984] E.C.R. 883. 
10. Ford of Europe Inc. v. Commission, Joined Cases 228–29/82, [1984] E.C.R. 
1129. 
11. BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken GmbH v. Commission, Case 35/83, [1985] E.C.R. 
363. 
12. The statement of objections sets out the evidence in support of the European 
Commission’s conclusion that there has been a breach of the EC competition rules. The 
undertakings concerned are given an opportunity to reply and to have an oral hearing 
before a hearing officer who is an official of the Commission, but not a party to the 
investigation. IBM, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, 2642. 
13. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
arts. 101–02, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88–89 [hereinafter TFEU]; Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic Community arts. 85–86, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 
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of a dominant position within a substantial part of the common 
market. The IBM lawyers challenged every procedural step taken 
by the Commission.14 The ECJ agreed with the opinion of Lord 
Slynn, which was richly documented with authority arising from 
earlier case law.15 He argued that the procedural steps in the 
European Commission’s investigation were purely preparatory 
acts.16 He concluded they lacked legal effect as to the interests of 
the undertakings concerned, and, therefore, were not “acts” 
within the meaning of the EEC Treaty that would give rise to a 
direct challenge from natural or legal persons.17 The statement 
of objections laid out the Commission’s reasoned conclusion that 
there was evidence to demonstrate that IBM had violated its 
dominant position by abusive conduct and therefore was in 
breach of article 86 of the EEC Treaty.18 The Advocate General 
and the Court reasoned that only when the Commission issued 
its final decision would IBM’s interests be affected.19 At that 
stage, IBM could challenge the Commission’s decision before the 
ECJ and raise any alleged procedural irregularities in respect of 
the statement of objections.20 
This was a very important case because it put an end to 
attempts to frustrate the Commission’s competition procedures 
by challenging each step in the process of investigating alleged 
anti-competitive behavior. Furthermore, when the legal systems 
of the EC Member States adopted similar competition law 
models, these rules were incorporated into their national legal 
systems;21 therefore, the opinion, and the confirming judgment, 
not only influenced the development of EC competition law, but 
also similar national laws. 
 
[hereinafter EEC Treaty]. At the time when the cases mentioned in this Essay were 
being considered by the European Commission and by the ECJ, the relevant European 
Economic Community Treaty competition provisions were known as articles 85 and 86. 
Since December 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force, these articles have been 
renumbered as articles 101 and 102, respectively. See The Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 
2007, art. 5(1), 2007 O.J. C 306/1, at 134 
14. IBM, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, 2642. 
15. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, IBM, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, 2661. 
16. Id. at 2663. 
17. Id. 2664. 
18. IBM, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, ¶ 2. 
19. Id. ¶ 21; Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, IBM, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, 2667. 
20. IBM, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, ¶ 25. 
21. See, e.g., Competition Act, 1998, c. 41, §§ 1–24 (Eng.). 
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II. THE PIONEER CASE 
The Pioneer case concerned a Commission decision22 
concluding that a concerted practice between several parties 
breached EEC Treaty article 85 (now TFEU article 101).23 The 
European importer of one of the world’s leading manufacturers 
of hi-fi equipment and the exclusive distributors of these 
products in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, were 
alleged to have engaged in concerted practices to restrict cross-
border trading by their dealers.24 Prior to this decision, the 
criteria for determining the amount of a fine imposed on 
undertakings for breach of the EC competition rules was mainly 
based on the gravity and duration of the infringement and 
amounted to a small percentage of the undertakings’ annual 
turnover.25 The decision marked a change in the Commission’s 
policy on fines given that the Commission calculated the fine in 
this case primarily by reference to the annual turnover of the 
undertakings concerned. Thus, this was an important case in the 
development of the European Commission’s policy on 
calculating fines to be imposed on undertakings found to have 
breached the EC competition rules.26 
The parties’ main argument was that the Commission had 
failed, in the course of the administrative procedure, to disclose 
the criteria upon which it intended to calculate the fine or to 
inform the parties of the approximate amount of the fine that 
the Commission was considering.27 It was at a much later stage 
that the Commission announced the size of the fine, which 
ranged between two-and-a-half and four percent of the annual 
turnover of the undertakings concerned.28 This was a 
considerably larger fine than those imposed in previous cases.29 
The parties alleged that the unprecedented severity of the fines 
 
22. Commission Decision No. 80/256/EEC, 1980 O.J. L 60/21 (Pioneer). 
23. SA Musique Diffusion Française v. Commission (Pioneer), Joined Cases 100–
103/80, [1983] E.C.R. 1825, ¶ 1. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. ¶¶ 20, 101. 
26. Although the case also involved matters of substance and procedure, the 
analysis in this Essay relates solely to Lord Slynn’s opinion on the Commission’s policy 
on fines. 
27. Pioneer, [1983] E.C.R. 1825, ¶ 20. 
28. Id. ¶ 103. 
29. Id. ¶¶ 102–03. 
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infringed the principle of equality of treatment given that no 
advance notice of the change of policy had been given to the 
parties and that in earlier decisions the Commission had 
imposed lower fines on undertakings where similar 
infringements had been established.30 
Although Lord Slynn opined that the failure to set out the 
criteria for imposing the fines in the statement of objections did 
not vitiate the decision, he concluded that the parties were not 
placed at such a disadvantage to warrant an annulment of the 
decision.31 Furthermore, in his view, the Court itself had given 
the parties full opportunity to comment on the manner in which 
the Commission had set the fine.32 Nevertheless, Lord Slynn 
commented that: 
[w]here, however, the Commission proposes to take account 
of a particular turnover in assessing a fine (as it appears to 
have done in this instance) it is my view desirable that the 
Commission should disclose that fact to the parties, in order 
that they may ascertain that the correct turnover is being 
used as a basis for the calculation. This is particularly 
desirable where (as in this instance) the Commission itself 
takes the view that the amount of the fine is ‘the real issue on 
this case’ and that amount is, in aggregate, substantially 
greater than the amount of any other fines imposed by the 
Commission.33 
Later in the opinion, Lord Slynn commented on the change in 
the Commission’s policy and how that should have been 
handled. Lord Slynn started by confirming this was a change of 
policy—not one of powers—given that Regulation 17/62,34 the 
procedural regulation governing the implementation of the EC 
competition rules, permitted fines up to ten percent of the 
 
30. Id. 
31. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Pioneer, Joined Cases 100–103/80, [1983] 
E.C.R. 1825, 1928. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Council Regulation 17/62 has been replaced by Council Regulation 1/2003, 
but the provisions regarding of the total amount that the European Commission may 
impose as a fine remain the same. Compare Council Regulation Implementing Articles 85 
and 86 of the EEC Treaty, No. 17/62, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959–62, at 87, with Council 
Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules On Competition Laid Down in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty, No. 1/2003, 2003 O.J. L 1/1. 
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relevant turnover or one million European units of account,35 
whichever was greater. He strongly supported the view that the 
Commission should be free to impose the most appropriate level 
of fines in each case and not be bound by precedent or a 
requirement to give advance notice.36 He acknowledged that 
fines may have to be increased as a deterrent, for example, where 
particular practices become prevalent.37 
Nevertheless, Lord Slynn concluded that when increasing 
the fines, the Commission should have some regard for the level 
of fines imposed in the past and that “it becomes particularly 
important to consider the gravity and duration of the 
infringement and its effects as well as the turnover.”38 He 
accepted that a deliberate infringement with wide ranging effects 
may well justify the maximum fine but this was not the case in 
this situation, as the Commission itself had acknowledged.39 
Thus, he concluded that the fine, particularly the one imposed 
on Pioneer, was greater than was justified.40 
Another interesting conclusion in this opinion relates to 
what kind of turnover the Commission should take into account 
when calculating the fine on the basis of turnover. Should the 
turnover be by reference to all the markets in which the 
undertakings operate or only those affected by the infringement? 
Lord Slynn rejected the submissions of the parties that 
“turnover” meant the turnover limited to a particular sector, as 
this would prevent the Commission from being able to impose a 
fine of sufficient size to amount to a real deterrent where a large 
conglomerate, with diversified interests, was found to be in 
infringement of the EC competition rules.41 Regulation 17/62 
was clear that the fine can be imposed up to ten percent of the 
undertaking’s total turnover.42 However, where the Commission 
expressly states that it used the turnover as a basis for calculating 
the amount of the fine to be imposed, then in Lord Slynn’s view, 
 
35. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Pioneer, [1982] E.C.R. 1825, 1946. “Units 
of account” refers to the European Currency Unit, the precursor to the Euro. 
36. Id. at 1946–47. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 1947. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 1949. 
42. Id. at 1949–50. 
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the Commission should take account of the extent to which the 
undertaking’s activities are diversified.43 Thus where an 
undertaking has committed an infringement in only a small 
sector of its activities, this is likely to be a less grave infringement 
than if it had taken place in the whole of its activities. In 
Pioneer’s case, Lord Slynn concluded that the Commission had 
been wrong in calculating the fine on the undertaking’s global, 
rather than European turnover.44  
Given that Regulation 17/62 did not expressly restrict the 
Commission’s authority to levy fines up to ten percent of the 
annual turnover, the Court could easily have followed the 
Commission’s interpretation that it was competent to impose a 
fine based on global turnover. In what was a novel issue for the 
Court, however, it followed the advice of the Advocate General. 
III. THE HASSELBLAD CASE 
In the Hasselblad case, the ECJ reviewed a Commission 
decision45 which had found that a concerted practice existed 
between a Swedish company which manufactured cameras 
(Hasselblad cameras) and six of its sole distributors in violation 
of EEC Treaty article 85(1) (now article 101(1) TFEU).46 One of 
the undertakings concerned was a British company that sought 
annulment of the decision.47 The ECJ reduced the fines 
substantially, as the Commission had been unable to show that 
cameras which were the subject of parallel imports had to wait 
longer for repairs with the applicant than did the same cameras 
in other Member States.48 Thus this conduct could not be 
regarded as restricting the supply of parallel imports.49 In 
reaching this conclusion, the ECJ no doubt was helped by the 
detailed analysis of the facts and evidence carried out by 
Advocate General Slynn. 
Advocate General Slynn concluded that that the applicant 
could not rely on the protection from fines under article 15(6) of 
 
43. Id. at 1950. 
44. Id. 
45. Commission Decision No. 82/367/EEC, 1982 O.J. L 161/18, at 34 
(Hasselblad). 
46. Hasselblad (GB) Ltd. v. Commission, Case 86/82, [1984] E.C.R. 883, ¶ 20. 
47. Id. ¶ 1. 
48. Id. ¶¶ 34, 57. 
49. Id. 
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Regulation 17/62 given that the proven concerted practice 
operated outside the sole distribution agreement which had been 
notified50 to the European Commission.51 This was so even 
though the notified agreement did include a prohibition on 
exports outside the contract territory. Then he proceeded to 
analyze the evidence and concluded that it had not been 
established that parallel imported cameras were discriminated 
against unlawfully.52 The opinion is a good illustration of the 
assistance that the Advocate General can give the Court by acting 
like a first instance judge and evaluating the evidence in a direct 
action before the ECJ where the parties seek judicial review of a 
Commission decision. 
IV. THE FORD CASE 
The Ford case was an important case in determining the 
scope of the European Commission’s powers when issuing an 
interim decision while carrying out an investigation. The 
Commission had ordered Ford to continue supplying right-hand-
drive cars from its production line to customers in Germany53 
while investigating whether a notified selective distribution 
agreement was incompatible with EEC Treaty article 85(1) and, if 
so, whether it could benefit from an article 85(3) exemption.54  
The main contention was that the European Commission 
had no competence to issue an interim decision requiring an 
undertaking to take a particular step which could not be 
 
50. Until 2004, there existed a centralized system that required firms to notify the 
Commission of any concerted practices and agreements whose clauses restricted 
competition. See Council Regulation No. 1/2003, 2003 O.J. L 1/1, at 1. 
51. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Hasselblad, Case 86/82, [1984] E.C.R. 883, 
927. 
52. Id. at 931. 
53. Commission Decision No. 82/628/EEC, 1982 O.J. L 256/20. 
54. Until the modernization of the enforcement of the EU’s competition rules, 
only the European Commission had the competence to decide that a notified 
agreement that is incompatible with ECC Treaty article 85(1) (which became article 
81(1) EC Treaty and now TFEU article 101(1)) could be exempted as it fulfilled the 
conditions of ECC Treaty article 85(3) (which became article 81(3) EC Treaty and now 
TFEU article 101(3)). Thus, an anti-competitive agreement could be granted an 
“exemption,” often for a definitive period of ten years. Since 2004, the notification 
system has been abolished and now it is for the parties and their legal advisers to 
evaluate the agreement as to its compatibility with article 101 TFEU as a whole. Thus an 
agreement that is incompatible with article 101(1) TFEU may now be “excepted” under 
TFEU article 101(3) if it meets the conditions of this provision. 
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required in the final decision.55 The European Commission 
could make an article 101(3) exemption conditional on a certain 
specific action being taken by the undertaking concerned, but it 
could not order the undertaking to take the action.56 Thus the 
question for the ECJ was whether the Commission could order in 
an interim decision something which the Commission could not 
order in a final decision.57 
Advocate General Slynn was quite clearly of the view that: 
Although an order may be different in form in an interim 
decision from a final order, what is ordered must not exceed 
in substance what the Commission could do in a final order. 
There may be situations where the distinction is not entirely 
clear, but it seems to me to flow from the ancillary nature of 
interim relief, ancillary that is to the limited powers 
conferred on the Commission.58 
He also analyzed other grounds for the annulment of the 
interim decision and concluded that the interim decision should 
be annulled “on the grounds that it was not within the 
Commission’s competence, was not ‘indispensable’ or 
‘conservatory’ and was not supported by a sufficiently clear case 
in law.”59 
The ECJ followed the reasoning of the Advocate General 
and annulled the Commission’s decision.60 
V. THE BAT CASE 
The last opinion to be considered concerns the relationship 
between the EC Treaty rules on competition and on the free 
movement of goods with regard to the protection of industrial 
and commercial property. As stated in the Introduction, Lord 
Slynn’s contribution to the development of the substantive law of 
the internal market was particularly significant. In the BAT case 
the opportunity arose for him to comment on this relationship 
within the context of a delimitation agreement between two 
 
55. Ford of Europe Inc. v. Commission, Joined Cases 228-29/82, [1984] E.C.R. 
1129, ¶¶ 15–16, 19–21. 
56. Id. ¶ 22. 
57. Id. ¶ 17. 
58. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Ford, [1984] E.C.R. 1129, 1169–70. 
59. Id. at 1172. 
60. Ford, [1984] E.C.R. 1129, ¶ 17. 
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trademark owners. The case concerned an agreement between 
BAT, a German manufacturer, and Segers, a small Dutch tobacco 
producer. Segers owned a trademark “Toltecs Special” and was 
threatened by BAT for violation of its own trademark 
“Condorcet” on the ground it caused confusion in the German 
market.61 In order to avoid expensive litigation, they entered into 
an agreement restricting Segers’ potential use of its trade mark in 
Germany and preventing Segers from challenging BAT’s right to 
use its own trademark even after the expiration of the 
trademark’s legal validity.62 Delimitation trademark agreements 
were common in Germany and were considered not to violate 
competition law, including EEC Treaty article 85, which prohibits 
agreements restricting competition.63 
Lord Slynn’s opinion made it clear that such agreements 
were prohibited by article 85(1) since the objective was to divide 
up the common market. Since the agreement did not fulfil the 
conditions of article 85(3), it could not be “exempted.”64 The 
ECJ agreed with the conclusions of Lord Slynn.65 
CONCLUSION 
Lord Slynn became an Advocate General at a time when the 
European Community was emerging from a decade of legislative 
inactivity in the 1970s. During that period the ECJ alone seemed 
to have kept the European dream alive by delivering significant 
rulings and judgments in the fields of competition and free 
movement of goods.66 During his seven years in office, Lord 
Slynn witnessed a complete change of political will with the 
European Union’s adoption of almost 300 proposals for 
legislation which would ensure that an internal market would 
become a reality by December 31, 1992. However, the legislative 
reform or modernization of the EC competition rules did not 
 
61. BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken GmbH v. Commission, Case 35/83, [1985] E.C.R. 
363, ¶¶ 7–8. 
62. Id. at ¶ 11. 
63. Id. at ¶ 33. 
64. Id. at 372. 
65. BAT, [1985] E.C.R. 363, ¶ 41. 
66. See supra notes 7–11. 
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take place until 2004,67 and therefore the development of EC 
competition law was very much in the hands of the Court. The 
competition law opinions mentioned above assisted the ECJ in 
strengthening the EU’s legal order and ensuring that the EU’s 
competition law regime developed in a robust and fair manner. 
The opinions in these cases concerned issues of competence 
both in relation to substantive law (BAT, Ford, Hasselblad, and 
Pioneer)68 and procedural law (IBM).69 
Although it is outside the scope of this Essay to discuss Lord 
Slynn’s wider contribution to the development and acceptance of 
EC law by national courts and judges, I cannot avoid making a 
general observation. I would not be surprised if a future 
evaluation of Lord Slynn’s role in the development of EU law 
does not conclude that his most significant contribution was after 
his return to the United Kingdom. As a member of the highest 
court in the United Kingdom, the Judicial Committee of the 
House of Lords, Lord Slynn was in an ideal position to influence 
the acceptance of EU law as part of the domestic law of the 
United Kingdom and to encourage his brethren to make 
references to the ECJ seeking interpretation of EU law. But 
perhaps even more significant may be the role he played in 
helping to inform, train, and encourage judges, academics, and 
students from Eastern Europe to embrace EC law. 
 
67. See Council Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules On Competition 
Laid Down in articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, No. 1/2003, art. 45, 2003 O.J. L 1/1, at 
25. 
68. See cases cited supra notes 8–11. 
69. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Commission (IBM), Case 60/81, [1981] E.C.R. 2639. 
